Directorate of Intelligence

~~Secret~~

25X1



Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Proposals and Prospects

25X1

A Research Paper

~~Secret~~

EUR 84-10003
January 1984

Copy 317



Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Proposals and Prospects

25X1

A Research Paper

This paper was prepared by Office of European Analysis, with contributions from Office of African and Latin American Analysis, and Office of Near East and South Asian Analysis.

25X1
25X1
25X1

Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, European Issues Division, EURA,

25X1
25X1

Secret
EUR 84-10003
January 1984

25X1

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Proposals and Prospects

25X1

Summary

Information available as of 1 January 1984 was used in this report.

Proposals for nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs) have received increasing attention during the past few years and may figure prominently in the Conference for Disarmament in Europe (CDE) now under way in Stockholm. Nevertheless, discussions about such zones have produced more smoke than fire. The only multilateral agreements on the subject now in force apply to the seabed, outer space, and Latin America. Antinuclear groups often hold up the Latin American nuclear-weapons-free zone (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as a model, but Brazil, Chile, and especially Argentina have refused to implement the treaty and are pursuing nuclear-weapons-related research.

25X1

The Soviet Union promotes the establishment of nuclear-weapons-free zones as a way, we believe, of weakening the military capabilities of the United States and its allies. The Soviets are also attempting to create uncertainty in the West about the need for nuclear weapons, sow dissension among Western countries, and encourage resistance in Western Europe to intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployment.

25X1

The obstacles to enforceable, multilateral NWFZs are formidable in every populated area of the globe. It has proven almost impossible to reconcile the competing interests of countries that possess nuclear weapons, of others that are developing a nuclear capability, and of those that want to avoid the pressures and dangers they perceive from the first two groups. While multilateral NWFZs are not making much headway among the governments of the world, polls, press commentaries, and statements by some politicians show a slow drift in public opinion in most developed countries toward accepting the nuclear-free concept. Leftist parties in particular appear increasingly susceptible to antinuclear arguments.

25X1

We believe that the South Pacific is the area where NWFZ proponents have the most chance of success over the next few years. At minimum, however, creation of a South Pacific zone would require leftist parties being in office in both Australia and New Zealand.

25X1

In Western Europe, where the NWFZ debate is intense, only a Nordic zone is a possibility in the short term. The Socialist government in Greece is openly advocating a Balkan zone, but it would be reluctant to alienate its key NATO allies to the advantage of its archrival Turkey, which adamantly opposes a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Balkans. The West German

25X1

Social Democrats, now in opposition, are moving closer to formal support for a Central European zone, but if they assumed power, they could only endorse such a proposal at great risk to West Germany's NATO role.

25X1

We expect that during the next few years the longing for denuclearization on the national level will complicate US initiatives in NATO. At a minimum, such sentiments will make political establishments more reluctant to accept defense measures that might stir up antinuclear sentiment. Possible actions to reduce public anxiety about nuclear weapons, such as restricting the movement of weapons, reducing the number of storage sites, or denying port access to nuclear-armed ships, could hamper US military operations in some areas.

25X1

At the maximum, the persistence of such views—coupled with an advent to office of strong leftwing governments—could lead Norway and Denmark, for example, to formally denuclearize their countries. The same would be possible in the Netherlands, but only if the political balance shifted drastically to the advantage of the Labor Party.

25X1

Contents

25X1

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones: Proposals and Prospects

25X1

Introduction

Increases in superpower tensions and the strong media spotlight on nuclear weapons in recent years have stimulated a search for alternatives to the status quo in strategic affairs. One of the ideas mentioned most frequently by journalists, politicians, and strategists intent on reducing nuclear dangers is the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones (NWFZs). Although all such proposals would prohibit nuclear weapons in a particular area, other provisions vary considerably, according to particular regional concerns. In many Third World regions, for example, zone proposals are designed to respond to concerns such as radioactive fallout from testing, nuclear waste disposal, the possibity of nuclear accidents, and nuclear proliferation.

The implications of these proposals for US interests also vary according to geopolitical and military factors. In Europe—where NATO's nuclear power helps balance the Soviet Union's conventional power and geographical advantage—the United States has opposed suggestions for NWFZs. The United States has also criticized a proposed zone in the South Pacific because it would be a major constraint on US naval forces. On the other hand, the United States has supported the concept of a NWFZ in Latin America (established in 1967 by the Treaty of Tlatelolco), and has backed proposals for such a zone in the Middle East.

Motivations of Non-Communist Countries

Politicians throughout the world have joined in the clamor for NWFZs with different degrees of sincerity and activism. In our judgment, only a few wholeheartedly share the reasoning of antinuclear activists and have a personal commitment to creating such a zone. Many governments have a more utilitarian view. For them, advocacy of NWFZs may be used as an instrument of foreign policy: to demonstrate a desire for peace; to show independence from one of the superpowers; to put a rival country in a bad light; or to serve as a token that can be bartered away or moderated if concerned countries will provide a desired quid pro quo. This is not, of course, to underestimate the domestic political dimensions of NWFZ proposals, as these are often used to boost the fortunes of parties or individuals.

25X1

Proposals for formal multilateral NWFZs are only one aspect of the desire to be "nuclear free"; this sentiment has also given rise to policies that exclude or restrict the presence of nuclear weapons within particular countries. Most, but not all, countries have renounced (at least officially) the possibility of developing nuclear weapons of their own by adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Furthermore, national policies which prohibit deployment or storage of nuclear weapons, ban visits by ships or overflights by aircraft carrying such weapons, or retain the right to approve such movements on a case-by-case basis, form a confusing patchwork of restrictions worldwide.

25X1

25X1

Soviet Policy

The Soviets generally promote the establishment of NWFZs in the West and the Third World. This policy undoubtedly stems from Soviet belief that:

- Soviet sponsorship of such zones will be accepted by some in the West as evidence of the USSR's peaceful intentions.

25X1

- As the legitimacy of the NWFZ concept grows, politicians and publics outside the Soviet sphere will question the rationales of their countries' security policies.

Major NWFZ Proposals

Area	*First Proposed*	*Proponents*	*Most Recent Proposal*	*Soviet Position*
Latin America	*1960s*	*Many*	*Treaty of Tlatelolco (in force since 1967)*	*Signed protocol with reservations*
Antarctica	*1950s*	*Many*	*Antarctic Treaty (in force since 1959)*	*Signatory*
Seabed	*1960s*	*Many*	*Seabed Treaty (in force since 1972)*	*Signatory*
Outer space	*1950s*	*Many*	*Outer Space Treaty (in force since 1967)*	*Signatory*
Central Europe	*1957 (Rapacki Plan)*	*Eastern Bloc; some leftist parties in Western Europe*	*Swedish demarche (1982)*	*Supports wider zone*
Scandinavia	*1963 (Kekonnen Plan)*	*Finland, Sweden; Nordic leftist parties*	*Sweden (1982)*	*Encourages action by Nordics*
Balkans	*1957*	*Romania, Bulgaria*	*Greece; Bulgaria (both current)*	*Cautious support*
Middle East	*1970s*	*Most Arab states*	*Annual UN resolutions*	*Cautious support*
Africa	*1970s*	*Many*	*Annual UN resolutions*	*Cautious support*
South Asia	*1970s*	*Pakistan*	*Annual UN resolutions*	*Cautious support*
Indian Ocean	*Early 1970s*	*Sri Lanka, many others*	*Under consideration in UN*	*Nominally in favor; private reservations*
South Pacific	*1970s*	*New Zealand (no longer supports); many island nations*	*Australia (1983) in South Pacific Forum; UN consideration*	*Cautious support*

25X1

- Discussion of such zones will sow dissension among Western countries by raising doubts in the United States about the reliability of its allies, and by fostering resentment against the United States for "forcing" nuclear weapons on its allies.

- They can ensure that their own military operations are not handicapped by falsely claiming that Soviet nuclear weapons are not present; we believe they sometimes do this now with visiting warships which in fact carry nuclear weapons.

25X1

Western Europe

Western Europe is the region where the debate over nuclear-weapons-free zones has been most widespread, and where the most vital US security interests are at stake. The controversy has gone deep; public opinion generally is against the presence of nuclear weapons, and in some cases even municipalities have declared themselves nuclear free. Hundreds of cities and towns in West Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Belgium have passed some form of antinuclear resolution. In most cases, however, these were passed more as expressions of preference than as serious legislation, and few politicians believe that the resolutions can stand up against the overriding authority of the national government in security affairs.

25X1

Although there is little possibility that peace movement activists will be able to parlay the municipal NWFZs into a de facto nuclearization of entire NATO countries, the zones hinder indirectly the governments' efforts to accommodate US military needs. While local governments have no direct authority, for example, over proposed transits of nuclear weapons through their communities, strong protests against such movements may in practice make the central government reluctant to force the issue. Suits

25X1

filed in local courts against nuclear weapons can also pose awkward political problems. Seeking the path of least resistance, governments at times are inclined to ask the United States for modifications of NATO procedures. In our judgment, field exercises for NATO's newly deployed INF could raise such problems in the basing countries.

Public opinion surveys indicate that excluding nuclear weapons is a popular idea among West Europeans, with some qualifications. Recent polls in several NATO countries show that more people view the presence of nuclear weapons in their country as unacceptable than accept them as necessary for deterrence. Moreover, when asked how they would vote if there were a binding referendum to remove nuclear weapons, large majorities in Italy and the Netherlands—and a plurality of 43 percent in West Germany—say they would vote yes. Another recent survey covering some of the same countries indicates that when the factor of Soviet conduct is introduced, respondents tend to be more cautious, though substantial antinuclear sentiment remains.

So far, government policy in most NATO countries has not reflected the negativism shown in the polls about nuclear weapons. Surveys generally do not measure how deeply respondents feel about an issue; in our view this is not lost on politicians, who sometimes judge that nuclear weapons issues, if handled skillfully, need not become a major factor in voting behavior. Nevertheless, we believe that the trend among political leaders toward use of public opinion polling, combined with the appearance of strong "peace" groups playing on nuclear themes, probably will make governments increasingly cautious on nuclear weapons issues.

Scandinavia

A proposal by Finland's President Kekkonen in 1963 is the cornerstone of the debate regarding a Nordic zone, even though Soviet Premier Khrushchev had proposed a denuclearized Scandinavia four years earlier. The so-called Kekkonen Plan called for the four Nordic countries—Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark—to formalize their nonnuclear status and create a nuclear-weapons-free zone. Sweden reacted positively to the concept, but the idea met opposition throughout the 1960s and 1970s from both center-left and center-right governments in Norway and Denmark. Although these two Nordic NATO allies in 1957 established a policy of not allowing

Soviet Maneuvering in Scandinavia

Occasional tantalizing suggestions from the USSR about a possible zone have led leftist parties to perceive a Soviet flexibility on territorial coverage and to criticize NATO governments for not pursuing the issue. For example, President Brezhnev said publicly in June 1981 that the Soviet Union did not rule out consideration of measures applicable to its territory in areas adjoining a Nordic zone. He also stated that the USSR would be willing to pledge no first use of nuclear weapons against the Nordic countries. 25X1

The deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee told a Norwegian minister in July 1981 that the USSR was ready to negotiate anywhere and any time about a zone. The Soviet campaign lost much of its momentum, however, when the Soviet press agency Novosti *disseminated an article that was picked up by the Western press stating that the Soviets were* not *prepared to withdraw nuclear weapons from the Kola Peninsula or include the Baltic in a NWFZ.* 25X1

25X1

In 1983, however, Soviet efforts again intensified. The first hint came in March when a Soviet general told a Swedish television audience that the USSR might be willing to withdraw six GOLF-class submarines from the Baltic. Then in June, Andropov personally stirred the pot, saying publicly that he was willing to discuss inclusion of the Baltic and did not rule out measures affecting Soviet territory. Finally, the deputy head of the CPSU International Department said in an interview last month that the USSR was prepared to withdraw all its submarines equipped with nuclear weapons from the Baltic. Given this record, the Soviets or their surrogates seem likely to introduce the idea of a Nordic zone at the CDE in Stockholm. 25X1

25X1

nuclear weapons on their territory in peacetime, in our analysis governments were concerned that foreclosing NATO's nuclear option completely would cause frictions with the other Allies and undermine nuclear deterrence.

Changes in Norwegian and Danish Attitudes. The Nordic NWFZ idea languished until the early 1980s when, nourished by concerns about the arms race as well as by Soviet propaganda, it took root in the fertile soil of the Norwegian Labor Party. Labor Party Prime Minister Odvar Nordli and other officials in 1980-81 suggested several approaches to the zone idea. This stimulated interest among the Laborites' counterparts in Denmark, the Social Democrats, who were also in power. Over the past three years, leaders of both parties have pursued the concept sporadically while making public statements that have left crucial points unclear:

- Is inclusion of the Baltic Sea and Soviet territory in the Kola Peninsula adjoining Scandinavia considered a sine qua non for a Nordic zone?

- If the four Scandinavian countries alone comprise the zone, would the Soviet Union have to agree to remove nuclear weapons targeted on Scandinavia from Kola and the Baltic? Or would Moscow simply have to pledge not to use nuclear weapons against the Nordics?

- Is a Nordic zone considered possible only in the context of a broader East-West disarmament agreement, and if so what would be the content and timing of the agreement?

Despite the efforts of the political left, the election of center-right governments in Norway and Denmark has cooled the NWFZ debate. Norway's Prime Minister Willoch privately told other Nordic prime ministers last July that his government considered the Nordic zone idea a dead letter; publicly the government takes the position that a zone could only come about as part of a comprehensive arms control agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Danish Government's current position, defined in a parliamentary resolution it reluctantly supported in February 1983, is to back "realistic efforts" aimed at establishing nuclear-weapons-free zones including Eastern as well as Western territory.

In our judgment, the main objections of these governments to Nordic zone proposals is that they create friction with other Allies and call into question their dedication to NATO. If, however, Norway and Denmark could enact a permanent ban on nuclear weapons while still benefiting from the NATO nuclear umbrella—and without having to face heavy criticism from their allies—we believe even these center-right governments would accept a NWFZ. Public statements by some officials in the foreign ministries lead us to suspect that they see a slight possibility of this happening if a Nordic zone could become part of a package deal on the European nuclear balance between the United States and the USSR.

Finnish and Swedish Attitudes. Currently the main impetus from the Western side toward a Nordic zone comes from the neutrals, Finland and Sweden, which have traditionally sought to minimize East-West tensions in the region. The Finns, who have long been concerned about Soviet pressures against their autonomy, have never really stopped promoting variations of the one-sided Kekkonen Plan. Since NATO's INF decision in 1979, they have pressed particularly hard for adoption of its basic premise—a "nuclear free" declaration by the Nordics after negotiations among themselves. According to the US Embassy in Helsinki, the Finns view a nuclear-weapons-free zone as a way of consolidating their legal position to resist possible pressure from the Soviets to allow weapons systems on Finnish soil.

The Swedish Government has been even more active in pursuit of a Nordic zone during the past year, although official statements have varied with different audiences:

- Prime Minister Olof Palme told the North Atlantic Assembly last June that a zone could be created in return for a pledge by the nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons targeted against Scandinavia from the immediate vicinity (presumably Kola). He also mentioned vaguely that there should be "undertakings" regarding the Baltic, to be negotiated in detail later.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

- Nebulous though these conditions were, Palme neglected to mention them the same month when he told a Finnish audience that the four Nordic countries could create a zone.

- Last November, Swedish Foreign Minister Bodstrom said in a speech that a zone could be created by a declaration of the four Nordic countries, accompanied by pledges from outside powers not to use nuclear weapons against them.

- In late December, however, Bodstrom specified that there would have to be a denuclearization arrangement for the Baltic, and a reduction of weapons directed against Scandinavia from adjacent areas.

Although the Swedish Government's last pronouncement appears to require greater concessions from the Soviets, its track record suggests that these stipulations may not survive over the long run. Swedish officials have also said in recent months that their government would not introduce NWFZ proposals at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) in Stockholm because the Nordics were not agreed among themselves. We believe, however, that if the idea were broached by the Soviets or others at the conference, Sweden would support it.

The Balkans

Although proposals for a Balkan nuclear-weapons-free zone date back to 1957, Greece in 1981 became the first Western country in the region to advocate a Balkan zone. The socialist Papandreou government almost immediately after coming to power suggested a summit conference of leaders from Greece, Turkey, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania to discuss the idea of a zone. Conflicting attitudes about a Balkan zone among the various countries precluded agreement even on an agenda for such a high-level meeting, so in the spring of 1983 the Papandreou government shifted gears and sent letters to other Balkan governments proposing an experts' meeting in January 1984 to help pave the way for a summit.[1]

[1] Bulgaria almost immediately accepted the invitation to a meeting in Athens. Albania, however, has refused in accordance with its longstanding rejection of multilateral negotiating forums other than the UN. Yugoslavia and Romania have accepted conditionally, insisting on a broader agenda for the meeting. Turkey's response to the invitation explicitly noted its opposition to the idea of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Balkans, but seemed to accept the idea of a meeting with a broader agenda that included NWFZs.

Chronology of Balkan NWFZ Activity

1957	*Romania proposes a Balkan zone.*
1959	*USSR backs Romanian proposal, seeking to discourage Greece from accepting nuclear weapons.*
1963	*USSR proposes NWFZ for Balkans and part of Mediterranean.*
1981	*Bulgaria proposes Balkan summit to discuss zone; USSR supports the proposal.* *Romania again proposes Balkan zone.* *Greece proposes Balkan summit (later changed to experts meeting) to discuss zone.*
1984	*Experts meeting scheduled for January in Athens.*

25X1

25X1

After suggesting the meeting, Papandreou used the attention he received from the media to publicize the NWFZ idea, most recently in talks with Romanian President Ceaucescu in December.

25X1

25X1

Preparations for the experts' meeting in Athens appear to be on schedule, but disagreements between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and other issues could still lead to its cancellation. Even if the meeting does occur, Turkish and Yugoslav opposition to formal negotiation on a zone, coupled with the absence of Albania, probably will bring the initiative to a standstill.

25X1

Nevertheless, the idea of a zone in the Balkans will continue to be raised by the Soviets and their allies. We believe that Bulgaria, for example, may propose such a zone at the CDE in Stockholm. For the near term, the Balkan zone idea fits Soviet objectives: it provides them with a "carrot" that is a natural

25X1

Papandreou's Motivations

Despite the international obstacles to discussing—much less agreeing on—a Balkan zone, Greece probably will continue to beat the drum for the idea. The nuclear-weapons-free zone concept has deep roots in Socialist thinking, and we believe it appeals to Prime Minister Papandreou as a long-range goal. In his handling of the issue, however, Papandreou seems to be focusing mainly on the immediate political advantages. A Socialist Party official noted last July, for example, that the government was using the Balkan zone issue to fend off attacks from the Greek Communists. Advocacy of a zone allows Papandreou to demonstrate that he is "struggling for peace" and deflects criticism he receives for having signed an agreement allowing US bases to remain in Greece. Since coming to power, we believe Papandreou has come to appreciate that exclusion of US bases would damage seriously Greece's relations with the United States and NATO and substantially aid Turkey in the bilateral competition for influence in the eastern Mediterranean. For the same reasons, the Greek Government is unlikely to follow through on earlier statements that it would force removal of US nuclear weapons from Greek soil, unless Turkey and Bulgaria also exclude such weapons.

complement to one of their current "sticks"—the threat to deploy nuclear missiles in Eastern Europe as a "response" to INF deployment.

Central Europe

The issue of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Central Europe can be traced back to the Rapacki Plan of 1957,[2] but there was a long hiatus in serious diplomatic activity until recently. Active consideration of a Central European zone was revived by the publication in 1982 of a report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, a group of politicians and arms control experts from 17 countries. The group, popularly known as the Palme Commission after its chairman, produced a global "blueprint for survival" that included a proposal for a limited Central European zone. The Commission reasoned that the removal of short-range "battlefield" nuclear weapons in areas close to the East-West dividing line in Central Europe would reduce the pressures for nuclear escalation in the event of war. As an illustration, the Commission suggested a zone 300 km wide (150 km on each side of the line) encompassing parts of West Germany, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. When Palme returned as Sweden's Prime Minister in 1982, his government sent a note to the United States, the USSR, and European governments stating that Sweden supported the 300-km idea and soliciting their views.

25X1

The Soviet Union last January issued a statement ostensibly approving the Commission's idea for a Central European nuclear-weapons-free zone but trying to turn the proposal to greater advantage by suggesting that the zone be 500 to 600 km wide. If accepted, this would have encompassed virtually all German territory, accomplishing the longstanding Soviet goal of denuclearizing West Germany. Except for Greece, the NATO allies sent negative responses to Stockholm, thus foreclosing any possibility of success for the idea. Most argued that such a zone would disrupt existing security arrangements and undermine deterrence while not affecting the status of the area as a nuclear target or precluding reintroduction of nuclear weapons during periods of tension. We believe, however, that these reactions probably will not prevent Sweden from supporting consideration of a Central European zone at future security conferences.

25X1

25X1

In the NATO countries, support for a Central European zone has been limited mainly to leftist opposition parties, most prominently the Social Democrats in West Germany. Some state-level Social Democratic organizations have endorsed the proposal for a 300-km zone, and a party working group on security issues has produced a draft report recommending negotiations for such a zone as a first step toward

25X1

[2] The Rapacki Plan, proposed by the Polish Foreign Minister in 1957, called for a ban on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons in Poland and the two Germanys. Subsequently, East Germany and Czechoslovakia agreed to be part of such a zone, and the USSR lent its public support. Later versions of the plan called for guarantees by the nuclear powers that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against countries in the zone.

Proposed Central Europe Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone

701083 (543543) 1-84

25X1

removing all nuclear weapons from Europe. Moreover, party Chairman Willy Brandt went so far as to state publicly in December that he might support a nuclear-weapons-free zone for all of Europe.

While agreement on such zones remains difficult, talk among experts, politicians, and the press about making countries nuclear free has helped create political pressures on governments. Leaders have generally handled such pressure through conciliatory gestures, at times conceding that denuclearization may be possible in the long run, or casting about for ways to reduce NATO's current reliance on nuclear weapons. Hints by allied leaders about a "pause" in US INF deployments after the first group of missiles is installed may be in part a response to such pressures.

The Swedish proposal highlights a disturbing tendency of many NWFZ proposals aimed at Europe: it ignores caveats that had been included in the Palme Commission's plan by its authors. The report of the Palme Commission had said that the Central European scheme *would be implemented in the context of an agreement on parity and mutual force reductions in Central Europe* (that is, an MBFR agreement). Stockholm's note to other countries—though purporting to be an endorsement of the Commission report—stated that the zone "*could promote* or be linked to" an MBFR agreement. In the first case, the implication is clear that a Central European zone would have to wait on an East-West accord on conventional force

25X1

25X1

The Treaty of Tlatelolco

This treaty, now in effect for 22 nations, is an attempt to combine well-defined obligations with an efficient enforcement system. Parties to the treaty agree to prohibit and to prevent the manufacture, testing, use, storage, deployment, or possession of nuclear weapons in their own territories. These obligations are to be verified both by regular safeguard inspections, conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and by an organization established by the treaty known as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

Under a so-called challenge inspection system, a member nation which suspects that a prohibited activity has occurred or is about to occur within the zone, can require OPANAL to conduct a special investigation. Any report resulting from such an inspection will be transmitted to the contracting parties, the UN General Assembly and Security Council, and the Organization of American States. To date, no party to the treaty has requested a special investigation.

An additional protocol to the treaty calls on outside states that control territories in the zone to extend nuclear-weapons-free status to those territories. This protocol has been ratified by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands; France has signed but not ratified it. A second protocol consists of a pledge by countries possessing nuclear weapons to respect the status of countries in the zone, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the treaty.

levels; in the second, a zone could clearly come first. Implementation of a zone in that way could be extremely detrimental to US interests because it would hamstring NATO nuclear capability while leaving in place the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority.

The Latin American Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone

The example of a working nuclear-weapons-free zone cited most often by proponents of such arrangements is the Latin American zone created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967. The United States and many other governments have pointed out the usefulness of this initial zone agreement in working toward other zones in areas like the Middle East. The treaty demonstrates the possibility of multinational cooperation on nuclear weapons issues even in heavily populated and politically developed regions, but it also illustrates potential weak spots in such international regimes.

Although the Treaty of Tlatelolco remains a considerable diplomatic achievement, in the end it may not succeed in keeping Latin America free of nuclear weapons. The main challenges come from Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, which have signed the treaty but rejected its implementation. Although these countries have stated officially that they do not intend to develop nuclear weapons, Argentina and Brazil refuse to accept full-scope safeguards over their nuclear facilities.

Argentina is in the most advanced stage of nuclear development and probably will have the capability to produce a nuclear weapon by the late 1980s or possibly earlier. Brazil is conducting sensitive nuclear research that may be weapons related, but we believe it is not likely to be able to develop nuclear weapons before the mid-1990s unless it decides to pursue a crash program to catch up with Argentina. Chile actively pursued wide-ranging nuclear research during the early 1970s, but government support declined with the advent of the Pinochet regime in 1973; the program is only now being revitalized. In our opinion, a nuclear explosives capability probably will remain out of Santiago's reach for at least 10 to 15 years.

25X1

Brazil, which in 1962 was the first Latin American country to propose a nuclear-weapons-free zone, has since signed and ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It has attached several conditions, however:

- All nations that are eligible to ratify Tlatelolco or its protocols, including Cuba, must do so.
- No nation may violate its provisions.
- Explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes must be permitted.

Argentina, which has signed the treaty but not ratified it, has also insisted on these conditions before ratification can take place. Moreover, Buenos Aires has also stipulated that current disagreements over nuclear safeguards must first be resolved with the IAEA and the United States. Argentina participates in OPANAL, however, and at the 1983 OPANAL session obtained passage of a resolution condemning the British for violating the treaty by using nuclear submarines in the 1982 Falklands war. Chile has signed and ratified the treaty but insists on full ratification by all other signatories—a condition obviously aimed at Argentina—before it will implement the treaty.

Cuba remains unlikely to sign Tlatelolco, given its insistence on several conditions—including a US evacuation of Guantanamo—but, in our analysis, it has no near-term prospects of becoming a nuclear weapons state. The only other holdouts in the zone are Guyana and the Caribbean islands of Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and the Grenadines, none of which has a nuclear development program.

The Middle East

Although there has been considerable discussion in international forums about a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the Middle East, we believe the major countries in the region view the concept more as a diplomatic gambit than as a serious disarmament proposal. The Arab states have tried to use the proposal to help achieve the nuclear disarmament of Israel, but their continuing unwillingness as a group to enter into direct talks with Tel Aviv or to express any other form of recognition has precluded a real diplomatic offensive. Israel has preferred to maintain its putative nuclear monopoly in the region as one element in a strategy designed to deter Arab attack and force the Arab states into direct talks on peace issues. 25X1

Egypt and Iran first introduced the concept of a Middle Eastern zone in a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1974. The resolution called on all states in the region to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and commended the idea of establishing a zone. Every regular session of the General Assembly since then has adopted a similar resolution. Israel opposed the resolutions during the 1970s but has voted for them since 1980. 25X1 25X1

No government inside or outside the region has given serious attention to the nuclear-weapons-free zone idea since Israel's attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981. Many Arab governments have concentrated on condemning Israel's action. The Israelis, on the other hand, have continued to use the zone concept in a pro forma way as a means of pressuring their neighbors to negotiate directly with them and thus accord them implicit recognition. 25X1 25X1

In our judgment, major obstacles still block the path toward a Middle Eastern zone:

- Israel and the Arab states have no diplomatic relations, and several Arab states still oppose Israel's right to exist. There clearly is no consensus about how to ensure their mutual security. 25X1
- The Arab states undoubtedly believe a NWFZ would put them at a disadvantage. Public statements by officials indicate that they assume Israel already has nuclear weapons; in our judgment, they doubt that the Israelis would observe treaty commitments to renounce such weapons or open their nuclear facilities to inspection.
- Israel, too, is unlikely to place much faith in Arab commitments to abide by treaty restrictions. 25X1

South Asia

Pakistan has been introducing resolutions in the UN General Assembly calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in South Asia since the mid-1970s, when India began its nuclear weapons testing. India has countered by proposing a bilateral nonagression treaty that would not address nuclear weapons. Several of the smaller countries of the region have expressed support for a South Asian zone, but without pursuing it in diplomatic channels.

We believe that a South Asian zone has little chance of being adopted because of the deep-seated political and military rivalry between India and Pakistan. Both countries now possess nuclear facilities capable of producing fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons. Each is chary of the other's nuclear potential and fearful of being left behind in an arms race. We believe, moreover, that India wants to acquire nuclear weapons partly to protect its security against China, which it regards as Pakistan's most important ally.

The Indian Ocean Zone of Peace

The "zone of peace" concept applied to the Indian Ocean differs substantially from the proposals discussed so far in that it refers to more than nuclear weapons. The UN General Assembly designated the Indian Ocean as such a zone in 1971 and called on the major powers to enter into consultation with the littoral states to eliminate all military bases, installations, and other aspects of great power military presence as well as nuclear weapons. The zone would encompass only the ocean area and islands and would not affect the territories of the littoral states. The United States has come under especially harsh criticism from some countries in the region for its increasing military presence in the region since the late 1970s.

The UN continues to be the focus for discussions on a zone of peace. Countries from the region and the Eastern Bloc have long demanded an international conference under UN sponsorship to work toward such a zone, but Western nations with security interests in the area, led by the United States, have resisted such a meeting unless guidelines can be agreed upon in advance that take into account their views (that is, safeguard their security interests). The US delegation to the UN has often reported that the United States is under considerable pressure, even from Western countries, to show greater openness to the idea of a conference. 25X1

We expect the pressure from regional states for a conference to increase, perhaps leading to some kind of a meeting over the next few years. There is no realistic possibility of a demilitarized zone's being created, however, because of opposition from the United States and its allies. Governments from the Indian Ocean region have not pursued actively the idea of concluding a treaty outside the UN framework. They probably realize that they would have considerable difficulty negotiating such a document among themselves, and that any treaty they produced would have little significance if the Western powers with a presence in the region did not agree to it. 25X1

25X1

The South Pacific

Antinuclear activity in the South Pacific initially grew out of fears regarding US nuclear weapons testing in the 1940s and 1950s and recently has been fueled by France's continuing nuclear weapons tests in French Polynesia. Proposals under consideration in the United States and Japan for dumping nuclear waste in the Pacific have added to the furor. These concerns, encouraged by controversy over nuclear weapons in the United States and Western Europe, have created a debate in the region about nuclear-free areas in the South Pacific. This debate has important implications for US security interests because of the propensity of many island governments to react against all things nuclear, including the presence of nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed US warships. 25X1

25X1

Antinuclear actions have been pursued at both the national and multinational levels. None of the South Pacific nations contemplates having nuclear weapons of its own, and some have shown a desire to keep foreign weapons out as well. The government of

Vanuatu, for example, in early 1982 denied permission for port visits by US Navy ships which it suspected might be nuclear armed. Fiji followed suit a few weeks later, but it subsequently rescinded the ban. This about-face may discourage for a time an inclination by other small island nations to prohibit US warship visits, but the possibility of such bans over the longer term cannot be discounted.

Ship visits have also been a problem periodically in Australia and New Zealand. Until recently, the states of Victoria and New South Wales, which include the ports of Sydney and Melbourne, did not allow port visits by nuclear-powered vessels. The Fraser government in 1982, however, established the federal government's primacy in determining port access, a formula to which the current Labor government of Prime Minister Hawke also subscribes. Local sentiment continues to be an important factor, however, in the government's decisions on individual visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships.

In New Zealand, where antinuclear sentiment has made inroads across the political spectrum, the National Party government of Prime Minister Muldoon has sought to cooperate with the United States even though it has occasionally canceled visits by US warships to avoid disruptive demonstrations. The Labor Party, however, is considerably more radical on nuclear issues. While in power from 1972 to 1975, Labor leaders prohibited visits by US warships and encouraged the antinuclear movement in the South Pacific generally. Although the current Labor leader has said that compromises could be worked out with the United States regarding port visits, his party would face strong and perhaps irresistible pressure from the antinuclear lobby if it is returned to power in the election scheduled for this fall.

The multinational side of the nuclear-free issue is generally played out in the South Pacific Forum.[3] This body, which began in 1972 as little more than a social club, has gradually devoted more attention to serious political issues. In 1976, the Forum agreed in principle that the South Pacific should be a nuclear-free zone, but this had little significance in the absence of action by national governments. 25X1

Last August, however, the Australian Government introduced a proposal for a South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone in the Forum. Calculated to reinforce that 25X1
government's credentials in the arms control field, the initiative was also intended to preempt more radical proposals from the small island states. The Australians attempted to accommodate the United States by proposing to allow transits through the area by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships, and by nuclear-armed aircraft. When the islanders agreed to the idea of a nuclear-free zone but balked at the free transit provisions, the Forum decided to defer further consideration of the proposal until the next annual meeting. 25X1
The Hawke government indicated that it would try to produce a formulation satisfactory to the island nations. 25X1

Although the current New Zealand Government reacted negatively to the Australian proposal, we believe that a Labor government in that country might well support it, given the party's previous record while in office. Moreover, it might try to influence the Australians to abandon their previous stipulation on military transits. With both Australia and New Zealand behind the idea of a nuclear-free South Pacific, agreement by most or all of the Forum members would become a stronger possibility. The possible geographic parameters remain vague, but we believe advocates of a zone may try to build it from overlapping national areas, implemented through national legislation, based on 200-mile territorial limits. Such an arrangement could seriously impair US naval operations in the area. 25X1

25X1

Africa

The first formal proposal at the UN to make Africa a zone free of nuclear weapons took the form of a resolution in 1961 sponsored by 14 African countries concerned about French nuclear testing in the Sahara. This resolution, which was approved by the UN

25X1

[3] The South Pacific Forum comprises the nine independent South Pacific island nations—Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Western Samoa, Vanuatu, Tonga, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru—plus the New Zealand dependencies of Niue and the Cook Islands. Australia and New Zealand participate because of their proximity and longstanding ties to the South Pacific and because the islanders look to them for economic aid.

General Assembly, asked all countries to respect the continent as a "denuclearized zone." The Soviet Union supported the proposal, but the United States and its allies termed it unacceptable because there were no provisions for control or verification.

In 1964, the members of the Organization of African Unity issued a declaration on the denuclearization of the continent which the UN subsequently endorsed, with all the nuclear powers except France voting in favor. In 1974, 26 African countries again proposed a resolution on denuclearization which was unanimously adopted.

Despite sporadic activity in international organizations since then, we believe that an effective treaty banning nuclear weapons from the African continent is not a likely prospect. South Africa, whose nuclear explosives development program has probably reached an advanced stage, is unlikely to agree to a ban; nor are the other African countries willing to negotiate with the South Africans. Egypt, which is also a potential nuclear power, does not wish to obligate itself without assurances that Israel will forgo nuclear weapons development. And while it would be relatively easy to establish an African NWFZ leaving out the "difficult" countries, there has not been much enthusiasm for a initiative that would simply confirm the status of countries that have no possibility of developing nuclear weapons.

Other Zones

Antarctica was demilitarized in 1959 through the Antarctic Treaty which was signed by 12 countries including the United States and the USSR. This agreement prohibits any measures of a military nature, including bases, fortifications, and testing of weapons; in effect, this constitutes a ban on nuclear weapons in Antarctica.

The *seabed* has also been the subject of a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.[4] This treaty obligates the parties not to place on or under the sea floor, beyond a 12-mile coastal zone, any nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or any facilities for such weapons. The treaty entered into force in 1972, and 76 nations including the United States and the USSR had ratified it by January 1983. 25X1

25X1

A demilitarization treaty on *outer space* entered into force in 1967, and 89 countries had signed it by 1982.[5] This treaty, inter alia, prohibits nations from placing nuclear weapons in orbit around the earth or on celestial bodies, or to station them in space in any other way. 25X1

Outlook 25X1

Despite the many nuclear-weapons-free zone proposals under discussion around the world, the South Pacific is the only region where proponents of a multilateral zone appear to have much possibility of success over the next few years. Even there, the creation of a zone would depend on leftist governments being in power in Australia and New Zealand, and a mood of cooperation between the two Labor parties which has often been missing in the past. 25X1

We believe that the next most likely zone—in Scandinavia—remains a long-shot possibility that could come about only if social democratic parties were in power in Norway and Denmark. Party leaders' recent lack of zeal in pushing the zone concept suggests that even then they would give priority to other disarmament initiatives. Nevertheless, a period of public hysteria about nuclear dangers, combined with a conviction that the United States was not taking their countries' interests into account, could still induce them to take the plunge for a NWFZ. 25X1

[4] Officially it is called the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. 25X1

[5] This agreement is officially called the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. 25X1

At the same time, denuclearization policies on a national level are a more distinct possibility in several areas. In Europe, even if a multilateral Nordic zone does not materialize, a return to office by leftist governments in Denmark and Norway might lead one or both to make the nonnuclear status of their countries formal and permanent. In the Netherlands, where all major political parties already agree that the number of the country's nuclear tasks in NATO should be reduced, a nuclear-free declaration is possible, but only if the political balance shifts markedly enough to allow the Labor Party to govern alone or with far left parties.

In other developed countries, declarations of nuclear-free status are less likely during the next decade, but they cannot be discounted completely. Popular fears of nuclear catastrophe and the increasing respectability of the "nuclear-free" escape hatch make it difficult for leftist parties with their traditional emphasis on disarmament *not* to pursue the concept. As long as the media continue to dwell on nuclear disaster, we believe that many leftist parties will pursue the idea of denuclearization—at least rhetorically, and in some cases actively.

But support from a leftist party or even the election of a leftist government does not necessarily lead toward nuclear-free status. Much still depends on other political circumstances: party balances, trade-offs on other issues, and the attitudes of individual leaders. We believe, for example, that it would be virtually impossible for a country to declare itself to be formally denuclearized unless the prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister strongly favored the idea. And officials in these positions are often inhibited by the possible international repercussions of their decisions—especially the country's relations with friendly nuclear weapons powers.

In the Third World, decisions by individual countries to become nuclear free are less predictable because they depend even more on the ideas of individual leaders or small political elites. By adhering to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, many less developed countries have renounced the possibility of developing nuclear weapons; many government leaders have also said that they would not allow nuclear weapons on their countries' territory. Statutory prohibitions, however, often do not exist in these countries. In considering such bans, many leaders would not have to worry that declaring their countries nuclear free would disrupt their strategic situation or that of their neighbors. In many of these countries, moreover, a decision on denuclearization could be taken with little or no domestic cost. On the other hand, leaders might not have much to gain by a denuclearization decision and might be willing to decide against this step in the face of remonstrances from outside powers.

25X1

25X1

Whether or not countries declare themselves nuclear free, we believe that the debate over the issue will make political establishments more reluctant to implement specific defense measures that might stir up antinuclear sentiment. Such discussions could also encourage governments to tighten restrictions on nuclear weapons by such actions as reducing the number of storage sites, restricting the movement of weapons, and denying port visits. These developments could complicate US initiatives in NATO and hamper US military operations in some areas.

25X1

25X1

We expect that the Soviets, perceiving strong discontent in Western countries about nuclear weapons, will try even harder to play to these concerns in their propaganda. In many cases, they will encourage surrogates to promote NWFZs, both to enhance the credibility of the proposals and to avoid detailed discussion about how Soviet compliance with zone provisions might be verified. In areas such as the Indian Ocean where we believe the Soviets fear their own interests could be harmed by a "zone of peace," they probably will try to avoid publicly opposing the idea and depend on Western powers to block moves toward a zone.

25X1

25X1

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZ)



701082 (A03985) 1-84

25X1